ftp' "'^ 



si 



It 



m 



11" 









(pUi^dJM^ 









Glass, 
Book. 









Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/howfreepeoplecon05stil 



HOW A FREE PEOPLE 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR: 



CHAPTER FROM ENGLISH HISTORY. 



BY 



.A 



CHARLES J/STILLE. 



PHILADELPHIA: 

COLLINS, PEINTER, 705 JAYNE STREET. 

1862. 



HOW A FREE PEOPLE 



CHAPTER FROM ENGLISH HISTORY 



B Y 

CHARLES J. STILLE. 



." -) 



PHILADELPHIA: 

COLLINS, PRINTER, 7 5 JAYNE STREET. 

1862. 



ylM 






History, if it be not the merest toy, the idlest pas- 
time of our vacant liours, is the record of the onward 
march of Humanity towards an end. Where there 
is no belief in such an end, and therefore no advance 
towards it, no stirrings of a Divine Word in a people's 
bosom, where not as yet the beast's heart has been 
taken away, and a man's heart given, there History 
cannot be said to be. They belong not therefore to 
History, least of all to sacred History, those Babels, 
those cities of confusion, those huge pens, into which 
by force and fraud, the early hunters of men, the 
Nimrods and the Sesostrises drave, and compelled 
their fellows : and Scripture is only most true to its 
idea while it passes them almost or wholly in silence 
by, while it lingers rather on the plains of Mamre 
with the man that "believed God and it was counted 
unto him for righteousness" than by "populous No" 
or great Babylon, where no faith existed but in the 
blind powers of nature, and the brute forces of the 
natural man. 

Trench's Hulsean Lecture, 

The Unity of Scripture. 



i*~ 



(/ 



N 



We have known hitherto in this country so little 
of the actual realities of war on a grand scale, that 
many are beginning to look upon the violent oppo- 
sition to the government, and the slowness of the 
progress of our arms, as signs of hopeless discourage- 
ment. History, however, shows us that these are 'the 
inevitable incidents of all wars waged by a free peo- 
ple. This might be abundantly illustrated by many 
remarkable events in English history, from the days 
of the Great Rebellion down through the campaigns 
of the Prince of Orange, and of Marlborough, to the 
wars which grew out of the events of the French Re- 
volution, War is always entered upon amidst a vast 
deal of popular enthusiasm, which is utterly unreason- 
ing. It is the universal voice of history, that such 
enthusiasm is wholly unreliable in supporting the pro- 
^longed and manifold burdens which are inseparable 
from every war waged on an extensive scale, and for 
a long period. The popular idea of war is a speedy 
and decisive victory, and an immediate occupation of 



4 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

the enemy's capital, followed by a treaty of peace by 

which the objects of the war are permanently secured. 

Nothing is revealed to the excited passions of the 

multitude, but dazzling visions of national glory, 

purchased by small privations, and the early and 

complete subjugation of their enemies. It is, there- 
of 

fore, not unnatural that at the first reverse they 
should yield at once to an unmanly depression, and, 
giving up all for lost, they should vent upon the go- 
vernment for its conduct of the war, and upon the 
army and its generals for their failure to make their 
dreams of victory realities, an abuse as unreasoning 
as was their original enthusiasm. 

Experience has taught the English people that the 
progress of a war never fulfils the popular expecta- 
tions ; that although victory may be assured at last 
to patient and untiring vigor and energy in its prose- 
cution, yet during the continuance of a long war there 
can be no well-founded hope of a uniform and con- 
stant series of brilliant triumphs in the field, illustrat- 
ing the profound wisdom of the policy of the Cabinet ; 
that, on the contrary, all war, even that which is 
most successful in the end, consists rather in check- 
ered fortunes, of alternations of victory and disaster, 
and that its conduct is generally marked by what 
were evidently, when viewed in the light of experi- 
ence, blunders so glaring in the policy adopted by the 
government, or in the strategy of its generals, that 
the wonder is success was achieved at all. The 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. O 

English have thus been tanght tlyit the true charac- 
teristic of public opinion in its judgment of a war 
should be, not hopefulness or impatience of immediate 
results, but rather a stern endurance — that King- 
quality of heroic constancy which, rooted deep in a 
profound conviction of the justice of the cause, sup- 
ports a lofty public spirit equally well in the midst of 
temporary disaster and in the hour of assured triumph. 
We have had no such experience here. Our peo- 
ple are perhaps more easily excited by success, and 
more readily depressed by reverses, than the English, 
and it is, therefore, worth while to consider how they 
carried on war on a grand scale and for a protracted 
period. It will be found, if we mistake not, that the 
denunciations of the government, so common among 
us of late, and the complaints of the inactivity of 
the army, have their exact counterpart in the history 
of the progress of all the wars in which England has 
been engaged since the days of the Great Rebellion. 
He who draws consolation from the lessons of the 
past, will not, we think, seek comfort in vain when 
he discovers that in all those wars in which the go- 
vernment and the army have been so bitterly assailed 
(except that of the American Revolution), England 
has at last been triumphant. It is worth while then 
to look into English history to understand how war 
is successfully carried on notwithstanding the obsta- 
cles which, owing to a perverted public opinion, exist 
within the nation itself. These difficulties, although 



b HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

they inhere in the very nature of a free government, 
often prove, as we shall see, more fruitful of embar- 
rassment to the favorable prosecution of a war than 
the active operations of the enemy. 

We propose to illustrate the propositions which we 
have advanced by a study of the series of campaigns 
known in English history as the Peninsular War. We 
select this particular war because we think that in 
many of its events and in the policy which sustained 
it, there are to be observed many important, almost 
startling, parallelisms with our present struggle. We 
have, of course, no reference to any similarity exist- 
ing in the principle which produced the two wars, 
but rather to the striking resemblance in the modes 
adopted by the two people for prosecuting war on a 
grand scale, and for the vindication of a piinciple 
regarded as of vital importance by them. 

The Peninsular War on the part of England, as was 
contended by the ministry during its progress, and as 
is now universally recognized, was a struggle not only 
to maintain her commercial supremacy (which was 
then, as it is now, her life), but also to protect her own 
soil from invasion by the French, by transferring the 
scene of conflict to distant Spain. The general pur- 
pose of assisting the alliance against Napoleon seems 
always to have been a subordinate motive. It is now 
admitted by all historians, that upon success in this 
war depended not only England's rank among nations, 
but her very existence as an independent people. 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 7 

The war was carried on for more than five years, and 
on a scale, so far as the number of men and the ex- 
tent of the military operations are concerned, until 
then wholly unattempted by England in her European 
wars. The result, as it need not be said, was not 
only to crown the British arms with the most brilliant 
and undying lustre, but also to retain permanently in 
their places the party whose only .title to public favor 
was that they had carried on the war against the most 
serious obstacles and brought it to a successful termi- 
nation. Thus was delayed, it may be remarked, for 
at least twenty years, the adoption of those measures 
of reform which at last gave to England that place 
in modern civilization which had long before been 
reached by most of the nations of the Continent by 
passing through the trials of a bloody revolution. If 
we, then, in our dark hours, are inclined to doubt and 
despondency as to the final result, let us not forget 
the ordeal through which England successfully passed. 
We shall find that, in the commencement, there was 
the same wild and unreasoning enthusiasm with which 
we are familiar ; the same bitter abuse and denuncia- 
tion of the government at the first reverses ; the same 
impatient and ignorant criticism of military opera- 
tions ; the same factious and disloyal opposition on 
the part of a powerful party ; the same discourage- 
ment and despondency at times on the part of the 
true and loyal ; the same prophecies of the utter hope- 
lessness of success ; the same complaints of grievous 



8 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

and burdensome, taxation, and predictions of the 
utter financial ruin of the country ; the same violent 
attacks upon the government for its arbitrary decrees, 
and particularly for the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus ; the same difficulties arising from the 
inexperience of the army ; and the same weakness on 
the .part of the government in not boldly and ener- 
getically supporting the army in the field. These are 
some of the more striking parallelisms between the 
Peninsular War and our own struggle, which a slight 
sketch of the progress of that war will render very 
apparent. 

The insurrection in Spain which followed immedi- 
ately upon a knowledge of the intrigues of Napoleon 
at'Bayonne in April, 1807, by which the royal family 
was entrapped into an abdication of its right to the 
throne, and Joseph Bonaparte made king of that 
country, roused universal admiration and enthusiasm 
in England. It was thought by all parties that an 
obstacle to the further progress of Napoleon's schemes' 
of the most formidable character had at last been 
found. It was the first popular insurrection in any 
country against Napoleon's power, and consequently, 
when the deputies from the Asturias reached England 
imploring succor, their appeals excited the popular 
feeling to the highest pitch, and the opposite parties 
in Parliament and the country vied with each other 
in demanding that England should aid the insurrec- 
tion with the whole of her military power. It is 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 9 

curious to observe, that when the question of aid 
was brought before Parliament, Mr. Canning and 
Mr. Sheridan, who had probably never acted together 
before on any political question, rivalled each other 
in their praise of the Spaniards, and in their expres- 
sions of hope and belief that Napoleon had at last 
taken a step which would speedily prove fatal to him. 
Large supplies were voted by acclamation, and an 
important expedition, afterwards operating in two 
columns, one under the command of Sir John Moore, 
the* other under that of Sir Arthur VVellesley, was 
dispatched to the Peninsula to aid the insurgents. 
It is not our purpose to trace the progress of this 
expedition, but merely to notice the effect Avhich its 
immediate results, the retreat to Corunna, and the 
Convention of Cintra, produced upon popular feeling 
in England. As we look back on the history of that 
time, the folly and madness which seized upon the 
popular mind when the terms of the Convention of 
Cintra became known, can only be explained by re- 
calling the high- wrought and extravagant expectations 
of immediate success with which the war had been 
entered upon. By this Convention, and as the result 
of a« single battle, Portugal was wholly evacuated by 
the French; yet such were the unreasonable demands 
of public opinion, that because the whole French 
army had not been made prisoners of war, the Min- 
istry was almost swept away by the outburst, and 
it could only control the storm by removing the 



10 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

two generals highest in rank. It required all the 
family and political influence of the third, Sir Arthur 
Wellesley, to enable him to retain his position in the 
army. The disastrous retreat of Sir John Moore's 
army to Corunna, and the easy triumphs of the French* 
at that period throughout all Spain, plunged the Eng- 
lish into despair. Going from one extreme to another, 
men who, only three months before, had quarrelled 
with the army in Portugal because it had not given 
them the spectacle of a French marshal and twenty 
thousand of his soldiers as prisoners of war at "^pit- 
head, now spoke openly of the folly of any attempt 
at all on the part of England to resist the progress of 
the French arms in the Peninsula. In Parliament 
there was the usual lame apology for disaster, an 
attempt to shift the responsibility from the Ministry 
to the General in command ; but the great fact, that 
all their hopes had been disappointed still remained, 
and after the explanations of the government the 
general despondency became more gloomy than ever. 
It is not difficult in the light of history to see where 
the blame of failure should rest. Any one who is 
disposed now to sneer and cavil at the shortcomings 
of our own administration, to impute to it views short- 
sighted and impracticable in their policy, and to blame 
it for want of energy and vigor in the prosecution of 
the War, has only to turn to Colonel Napier's account 
of the stupid blunders of the English government, its 
absurd and contradictory orders, its absolute ignorance 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 11 

not only of the elementary principles of all war, but 
of the very nature of the country in which the army 
was to operate, and of the resources of the enemy, to 
be convinced that had its mode of carrying on hos- 
tilities, (which was the popular one,) been adopted, in 
six months not an English soldier would have remained 
in the Peninsula except as a prisoner of war. The 
history of this campaign contains important lessons 
for us ; it shows conclusively that the immediate re- 
sults of war are nfiver equal to the public expectation, 
and that if this public expectation, defeated by the 
imbecility of the government, or soured by disaster 
in the field, is to be the sole rule by which military 
operations are to be judged, no war for the defence of 
a principle can long be carried on. 

Fortunately for the fame and the power of England, 
the Ministry, although ignorant of the true mode of 
prosecuting hostilities, had sense enough to perceive 
that their only true policy was perseverance. They 
were strong enough to resist the formidable opposition 
which the events we have referred to developed in 
Parliament and the country, and, undismayed by the 
experience of the past, concluded a 'treaty with the 
Provisional Government of Spain, by which they 
pledged England never to abandon the national cause 
until the French were driven across the Pyrenees. 
The army was placed upon a better footing, was 
largely reinforced, and Sir Arthur Wellesley was ap- 
pointed to the chief command. The government, not 



12 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

yet wholly awakened from its illusions, still thought 
it practicable to reach Madrid in a single campaign, 
and to that end the eftbrts of Wellington were di- 
rected. It became necessary first to dislodge Soult 
at Oporto, and the magnificent victory of the English- 
gained by the passage of the Douro at that point went 
far to revive confidence at home in the invincibility 
of their army. Yet so clear is it that victory in war 
often depends upon what, for some better name, we 
may call mere good fortune, that we have the author- 
ity of the Duke of Wellington himself for saying, 
that this army, which had just exhibited such prodi- 
gies of valor, v»^as then in such a state of demoraliza- 
tion, that although "-excellent on parade, excellent to 
light, it was worse than an enemy in a country, and 
' liable to dissolution alike by success or defeat." Cer- 
tainly no severer criticism has ever been justified by 
the inexperience and want of discipline of our own 
raw levies than that contained in this memorable de- 
claration. A little reflection and candor might per- 
haps teach us, as it did the English, that nothing can 
compensate for the want of experience, and that every 
allowance is to be made for disasters where it is 
necessary to educate both officers and soldiers in the 
actual presence of the enemy. Wellington soon after- 
wards moved towards the Spanish frontier, hoping by 
a junction with the army under Cuesta to fight a 
battle with the French v/hich would open to him the 
road to the capital. The battle was fought at Tala- 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 13 

vera, and although it has since been claimed by the 
English as one of their proudest victories, and the 
name of Talavera is now inscribed upon the stand- 
ards of the regiments who took part in it with those 
of Salamanca and Vittoria, yet the result was in the 
end, that Wellington was obliged to retreat to Lisbon 
just three months after he had set out from that place, 
having left his wounded in the hands of the French, 
having escaped as if by a miracle from being wholly 
cut off in his retreat, and having lost one-third of his 
army in battle and by disease. Of course the blame 
was thrown upon the want of co-operation on the 
part of the Spaniards. This we have nothing to do 
with ; it is the result of the campaign with which we 
are concerned. Dependence upon the Spaniards was 
certainly, as it turned out, a fault, but it was one of 
the fair chances of war, and it was a fault in which 
Wellington, made wise by experience, was never 
again detected. 

When the news of the untoward result of this 
campaign reached England, the clamor against the 
Government and against Wellington was quite as 
violent as that excited by the disasters of Sir John 
Moore's army. The opposition in Parliament took 
advantage of this feeling to rouse public opinion to 
such a manifestation as might compel the termina- 
tion of the war in the Peninsula and drive the minis- 
try from office. The Common Council of London, 
probably a fair exponent of the opinions of the middle 



X 



14 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

class, petitioned the King not to confirm the grant of 
£2000 a year, which the Ministry had succeeded in 
getting Parliament to vote to Wellington. The peti- 
tioners ridiculed the idea that a battle attended with 
such results should be called a victory. " It should 
rather be called a calamity,^' they said, " since we were 
obliged to seek safety in a precipitate flight, abandon- 
ing many thousands of our wounded countrymen into 
the hands of the French." In the opinion of the strate- 
gists in the Common Council and of their friends in 
Parliament, Wellington might be a brave officer, but he 
was no general; he had neglected the protection of his 
flanks and his line of communication. When it is re- 
membered, that at this very time, Wellington, profiting 
by the experience of the past, was diligently making 
his army really eff'ective within the lines of Torres 
Vedras, from which stronghold it was in due time to 
sally forth like a giant refreshed, never to rest until 
it had planted the English flag on the heights of 
Toulouse, we may perhaps smile at the presumption 
of those who, sincere well wishers to the cause, dis- 
played only their ignorance in their criticism. But 
what shall be said of those who, knowing better, being 
quite able to understand the wisdom of the policy 
adopted by the General to insure success in the stu- 
pendous enterprise in which the country was engaged, 
yet with a factious spirit and with the sole object of 
getting into power themselves, took advantage of the 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 15 

excitement of the ignorant multitude to paralyze the 
energies of the government ] 

That hideous moral leprosy, which seems to be the 
sad but invariable attendant upon all political discus- 
sions in a free government, corrupting the very sources 
of public life, breeding only the base spirit of fac- 
tion, had taken complete possession of the opposition, 
and in its sordid calculations, the dishonor of the 
country, or the danger of the army, was as nothing pro- 
vided the office, the power, and the patronage of the 
government were secured in their hands. It mattered 
little to them, provided they could drive the ministry 
from office, whether its downfall was brought about by 
blunders in Spain, or by the King's obstinacy about 
Catholic Emancipation, or by an obscure quarrel 
about the influence of the Lords of the bed-chamber. 
The sincerity of these declamations of the opposition 
was curiously enough put to the test some time after- 
wards, when the ministry, wearied by the factious 
demagogueism with which all their measures were 
assailed, and understanding perfectly their signifi- 
cance, boldly challenged their opponents, if they were 
in earnest, to make a definite motion in the House 
of Commons, that Portugal should be abandoned to 
its fate. This move completely unmasked their game, 
and for a time silenced the clamor, for it was per- 
fectly understood on all hands, that deep in the popu- 
lar heart, undisturbed by the storms which swept over 
its surface, there was a thorough and abiding convic- 



16 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

tion of the absolute necessity of resisting the progress 
of Napoleon's arms, and that the real safety of England 
herself required that that resistance should then be 
made in Spain. Still this noisy clamor did immense 
mischief; it weakened the government, it prolonged 
the strife, it alarmed the timid, it discouraged the 
true, and it so far imposed upon Napoleon himself, 
that thinking that in these angry invectives against 
the government he found the real exponent of English 
sentiment, he concluded, not unnaturally, that the 
people were tired and disgusted with the war, and 
that the privations which it occasioned were like a 
cancer, slowly but surely eating out the sources of 
national life. 

In the midst of these violent tumults at home, 
Wellington was silently preparing for his great work 
within the lines of Torres Vedras. It would not be 
easy to overrate the difficulties by which he was sur- 
rounded. He was fully aware of the outcry which 
had been raised against him ; he knew that from a 
Cabinet so weakened by internal dissensions as to be 
on the verge of overthrow from the vigorous assaults 
of the opposition, and from its own unpopularity occa- 
sioned by the failure of the Walcheren expedition, 
and the disasters in the Peninsula, he could expect 
no thorough and reliable support. Indeed the govern- 
ment, almost in despair, threw the whole responsi- 
bility for the military measures on the Continent on 
him alone. He accepted the responsibility in a most 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 17 

magnanimous spirit. "I conceive," he writes, -'that 
the honor and the interests of the country require 
that we should hold our position here as long as possi- 
ble, and, please God, I will maintain it as long as I 
can. I will neither endeavor to shift from my own 
shoulders on those of the ministers, the responsibility 
for the failure, by calling for means which I know 
they cannot give, and which perhaps would not add 
materially to the facility of attaining our object ; nor 
will I give to the ministers, who are not strong, and 
who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an 
excuse for withdrawing the army from a position 
which, in my opinion, the honor and interest of the 
country require they should maintain as long as possi- 
ble." Animated by this heroic sense of duty, the 
Commander-in-Chief prepared to contend against the 
200,000 men under Massena, whom Napoleon had 
sent to chase him into the sea. He had, to oppose 
this immense force, only 25,000 English soldiers, and 
about the same number of Portuguese tolerably or- 
ganized. Secure within the lines of Torres Vedras, 
he quietly waited until the want of provisions, and 
the utter hopelessness of an assault upon his position 
forced upon Massena the necessity of retreating. 
Then instantly pursuing, in a series of battles, of 
almost daily occurrence, he drove Massena out of 
Portugal, and reached once more the Spanish fron- 
tier in May, 1811, nearly three years after the English 
had sent an army to the assistance of the Peninsula. 



18 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

Here he rested for a long time, making prepara- 
tions for the siege of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, 
operations requiring time, and the success of which 
was essential to the safety of the army in its further 
progress. Still, so little was Wellington's position, 
military and political, understood in England even at 
that time, after all the proofs he had given of consum- 
mate ability, that public clamor was again roused 
against the mode adopted by him for conducting the 
war. As there were no disasters at which to grumble, 
people talked of " barren victories," because, like 
those of Crecy and Azincourt, they brought no terri- 
torial acquisitions, forgetting then what they have 
never been weary of boastingly proclaiming since, 
that these victories were the best proofs that their 
army was distinguished by the highest military quali- 
ties, which, properly directed and supported, were 
capable of achieving the most glorious results. So 
profound was the conviction of the immense supe- 
riority of the French both in numbers, and in the 
quality of their troops, that the public mind was in a 
state of feverish anxiety, and many of the stoutest 
hearts gave way to despair. About this period Sir 
Walter Scott writes to Mr. Ellis : " These cursed, 
double cursed news (from Spain) have sunk my spirits 
so much, that I am almost at disbelieving a Provi- 
dence ; God forgive me, but I think some evil demon 
has been permitted in the shape of this tyrannical 
monster, whom God has sent on the nations visited 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 19 

in his anger. The spring-tide may, for aught I know, 
break upon us in the next session of Parliament, 
There is an evil fate upon us in all we do at home 
or abroad." So Sir James Mackintosh, writing to 
Gentz, at Vienna: "I believe, like you, in a resur- 
rection, because I believe in the immortality of civili- 
zation, but when, and by whom, and in what form, 
are questions which I have not the sagacity to answer, 
and on which it would be boldness to hazard a con- 
jecture. A dark and stormy night, a black series of 
ages may be prepared for our posterity, before the 
dawn that opens the more perfect day. Who can 
tell how long that fearful night may be before the 
dawn of a brighter morrow % The race of man may 
reach the promised land; but there is no assurance 
that the present generation will not perish in the 
wilderness." As if to render the situation more 
gloomy, if possible, the Marquis of Wellesley, the 
brother of Wellington, left the ministry upon the 
avowed ground that the government would not sup- 
port the war with sufficient vigor. History has 
stripped his conduct of any such worthy motive, and 
shown that the real trouble was his anxiety to sup- 
plant Mr. Perceval. At the same time the attack was 
kept up in the opposite quarter, " No man in his 
senses," said Sir Francis Burdett, " could entertain a 
hope of the final success of our arms in the Peninsula, 
Our laurels were great but barren, and our victories 
in their efi'ects mere defeats." Mr. Whitbread, too, as 



20 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

usual, was not behindhand with his prophecies. " He 
saw no reason," he said, " to alter his views respecting 
peace ; war must otherwise terminate in the subjuga- 
tion of either of the contending powers. They were 
both great ; but this was a country of factitious great- 
ness ; France was a country of natural greatness." 
So, General Tarleton " had the doctrine of Mr. Fox 
in his favor, who wished for the pencil of a Cervantes 
to be able to ridicule those who desired to enter upon 
a continental war."* 

Thus, from universal enthusiasm in favor of the 

* The following description of the opposition of that day, taken from 
the Ayinual Register for 1812, bears so striking a likeness to the pecu- 
liarities of the leaders of an insignificant, but restless faction among us, 
that, omitting the old-fashioned drapery of the proper names, they seem 
to have sat for the photograph. "It may be remarked as a most singu- 
lar circumstance, that those persons in this country who profess to have 
the greatest abhorrence of ministerial tyranny and oppression, look with 
the utmost coolness on the tyranny and oppression of Bonaparte. The 
regular opposition do not mention it with that abhorrence which might 
be expected from them ; but the leaders of the popular party in Parlia- 
ment go further. They are almost always ready to find an excuse for 
the conduct of Bonaparte. The most violent and unjustifiable acts of 
his tyranny raise but feeble indignation in their minds, while the most 
trifling act of ministerial oppression is inveighed against with the utmost 
bitterness. Ready and unsuspecting credence is given to every account 
of Bonaparte's success ; while the accounts of the success of his oppo- 
nents are received with coldness and distrust. Were it not for these 
things, the conduct of Mr. Whitbread and his friends would be hailed 
with more satisfaction, and inspire more confidence with the real lovers 
of their country ; for they deserve ample credit for the undaunted and 
unwearied firmness with which they have set themselves against abuses 
and against every instance of oppression." 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 21 

Spanish war, public opinion, at first manifesting itself 
through the factious spirit of the opposition, at length 
spoke through all its organs, in tones of despondency 
and despair, of the situation and prospects of the 
country, and simply because there had not been that 
sort of military success which it could understand, to 
sustain and direct it. Universal distrust seized upon 
the public mind, and had it not been for the heroic 
constancy of that great Commander, whose task in 
supporting the ministry at home was at least as diffi- 
cult as that of beating the French in Spain, the glory 
of England had sunk forever. 

Yet it happened, as it so often happens in the order 
of Divine Providence, in the moral as in the physical 
world, that the night was darkest just before dawn. 
Amidst all this universal despondency and sinister 
foreboding, events were preparing which in a few 
short months changed the whole face of Europe, and 
forced back that torrent of revolutionary success which 
had spread over the whole Continent, until it over- 
whelmed the country where it had its source in com- 
plete ruin. The discussions in Parliament to which 
we have referred took place in February, 1812. 
With the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo on the eighteenth 
of January of that year, with the fall of Badajoz on 
the 26th of March, the first battle of Salamanca on 
the 20th of July, and Napoleon's invasion of Russia 
in June in the same year, began the downfall of the 
French Empire. 



22 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

Wellington at last reached Madrid in August, 1812, 
more than four years later than he ought to have 
done, according to the strategists of Parliament and 
the Press. This was all forgotten at the moment, so 
magic a wand is held by success. The fickle voice 
of popular applause was again heard, echoing the 
spirit of confidence which his persistent and un- 
daunted conduct had revived in the hearts of his 
countrymen. His career of victory, however, was 
destined not to be unchecked, and when, after his 
occupation of Madrid, his unsuccessful assault upon 
the Castle of Burgos rendered a retreat to the Por- 
tuguese frontier and the evacuation of the capital a 
proper military movement, although that retreat was 
compensated for by the abandonment of Andalusia by 
the French, in order to concentrate their whole force 
against him, still the blind multitude could not be 
made to understand it, and began again to murmur. 

It is not now difiicult to see that the victory at 
Salamanca was really what the far-seeing sagacity of 
Marshal Soult predicted at the time it would become, 
" a prodigious historical event," that it was the pivot 
on which at that time hinged the destinies of Eng- 
land, one of those battles of which we see perhaps a 
dozen only in the whole course of History which are 
really decisive of the fate of Empires. It completely 
unloosed the French power in the Peninsula, and 
prepared the way for the great success of Vittoria, the 
next year, which gave the coup de grace to the French 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 23 

military occupation of Spain. It is not our present 
purpose to trace the history of the next campaign, 
but it is curious to observe the effects produced 
by assured success upon that public opinion which 
had shifted so often and so strangely during the 
progress of this eventful struggle. The opposition, 
as their only hope of escape from political annihila- 
tion, and thinking to swim with the popular current, 
abused the ministers for not supporting Wellington 
with sufficient earnestness, complaining that they had 
taken the advice which they themselves had so often 
and so eloquently tendered. But it was of no avail; 
this wretched charlatanism was too transparent to 
impose upon any one, and of the great party who 
opposed the war, no one ever after rose to office or 
power in England. It required a whole, generation 
in the opinion of the English constituencies, to expiate 
the faults of those who had sneered at the great 
Duke, and had called the glorious fields of Vimeiro, 
Busaco, Talavera, Fuentes d'Onor, Ciudad Rodrigo, 
and Badajoz, names which had become associated 
with the proudest recollections of English renown, 
" mere barren victories, equal in their effects to de- 
feats." 

We pass now to the consideration of another class 
of difficulties inherent in the prosecution of every 
war, and generally of far greater magnitude than any 
other, — those connected with the raising of the vast 
sums of money required for the support of military 



24 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

operations. In this important matter, if we mistake 
not, there are some striking points of resemblance 
between the English experience during the war, and 
our present situation. It is the fashion among many 
who seek to excite the public alarm on this subject 
from unworthy, and sometimes, it may be feared, from 
treasonable motives, to represent the enormous outlay 
of the nation's wealth which is poured out to save the 
nation's life, as wholly unparalleled in history. Yet 
it may be asserted, without any fear of contradiction, 
that England, with a population then little more than 
half of that which now inhabits our loyal States, with 
resources infinitely less in proportion at that time 
than our own, her manufacturing industry so far as 
external outlet was concerned wholly crippled by the 
operation of the French continental system and her 
own Orders in Council, expended, during every 
year of the Peninsular war, as large a sum as has 
been required here each year to create and keep up 
the gigantic force now in arms to put down the Re- 
bellion. During the five years that the war lasted, 
her average annual expenditure exceeded ninety 
millions of pounds sterling or four hundred and fifty 
millions of dollars, which is about the same sum 
which is demanded of us. No one, of course, pretends 
to say that this rate of expenditure is not appalling, 
yet it concerns us to know that it is not unprecedented, 
and that these vast amounts have been raised from 
national resources far inferior to our own. It should 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 25 

not be forgotten, also, that they represent the money 
price of England's independence, and if ours is secured 
by a far greater outlay, we certainly are not disposed 
to quarrel with the wisdom of the investment. 

The question is, how were these immense sums raised 
in England 1 The man who would have predicted, at 
the commencement of the war with France, that the 
English national debt would at its close exceed one 
thousand millions of pounds sterling, and that the 
country would be able to bear such a burden, would 
have been regarded as a visionary as wild as he who 
in this country, two years ago, might have foretold the 
present amount of our national debt, and have con- 
tended that, in spite of it, the public credit would re- 
main unimpaired. The difficulty in England of raising 
these vast sums was tenfold greater than it is here.' 
Napoleon, looking upon England as the Southern 
people have been taught to regard us, as a purely 
commercial nation, undoubtedly placed more reliance 
for ultimate success upon the instinct of money get- 
ting, which would shrink from the pecuniary sacrifices 
necessary in a prolonged struggle, than upon the 
mere victories of his army. Hence he pursued, during 
his whole career, an inflexible purpose of ruining 
English Commerce, and by a series of measures known 
as the Continental system, endeavored to exclude 
English ships and English products from the markets 
of the world. The effect of these measures, although 
not so serious as he wished and had anticipated, 



26 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

nevertheless crippled enormously the resources of 
England just at the period when they were most 
needed. 

Taking the three years before the issuing of the 
Orders in Council and the vigorous enforcement of 
the Continental system, which were coincident in 
point of time with the commencement of the Spanish 
war, the average annual exports sank from fifty-seven 
millions to twenty-three millions, taking the average 
of three years after they had been in operation. Taxes 
were laid on at a most burdensome rate. The in- 
come tax was ten per cent., and besides, specific war 
taxes amounting to more than twenty millions a 
year were imposed. Notwithstanding all these taxes, 
the debt increased more than one thousand mil- 
Jions of dollars during the Peninsular war.. Discon- 
tent and violence among the laboring classes became 
universal, and it was remarked that the achievement 
of the greatest victories in Spain was celebrated 
in England " amidst a population who had been 
prevented by the burden of taxation on the absolute 
necessaries of life, from securing a livelihood by the 
strictest industry, and thus pauperism had been 
generated throughout the land, a pauperism aggra- 
vated by a spirit of pillage, which it required a strong 
military force to repress." Bankruptcy and ruin fell 
upon the trading classes, and absolute exhaustion of 
the resources of tthe country seemed almost reached. 
The public stocks had sunk to such a degree that the 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 27 

three per cents., which are now always above 90 per 
cent., were rarely higher during the war than 65 per 
cent., and so depressed at last had the public credit 
become, that the last loan of the Continental war, that 
of April, 1815, was taken by the Contractor at 53 per 
cent., and paid for in the depreciated paper of the 
day, and yet the Chancellor of the Exchequer was 
congratulated even by the opposition for having made 
" a good operation." The Bank was in a state of 
chronic suspension, the buying and selling of gold were 
prohibited to the public under severe penalties, and 
yet every gold guinea which- was sent by the Govern- 
ment to the army in Spain (and nothing else would 
answer the purpose of money in that country) cost 
thirty per cent, premium. How England survived 
all this complication of troubles is one of the mar- 
vels of history, but it is not our purpose to discuss 
that question. The great fact that the money required 
was raised somehow is all we have to do with at pre- 
sent. When we have been at war for twenty years, 
and are forced, in order to raise the means of carrying 
it on, to submit to one tithe of the_ sacrifices which 
were endured by the English, we may then perhaps 
begin seriously to consider the money value of the 
Union. 

The lesson which this review of the progress of 
the Peninsular war teaches, is, it seems to us, one of 
hope and encouragement, for if it shows anything 
it proves clearly, that in the support of public 



28 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

opinion, and in the means requisite to maintain 
a great army, those fundamental essentials of real 
military success, our Government is immeasurably 
stronger than the English ever was at any period of 
the war. It teaches also another important lesson, 
and that is, that there is such a thing as public 
opinion falsely so called, which is noisy just in pro- 
portion as its real influence is narrow and restricted. 
One of the most difficult and delicate tasks of the 
statesman is to distinguish the true from this false 
opinion, the factious demagogue from the grumbling 
but sincere patriot, and to recognize with a ready in- 
stinct the voice which comes from the depths of the 
great heart of the people, in warning it may be some- 
times, in encouragement often, but always echoing its 
abiding faith in the ultimate triumph of the good cause. 
We have confined ourselves in our illustrations to 
the discussion of questions as they affected the success 
of purely military operations, because we feel that 
here our grand business is to clear away the obstacles, 
real or fancied, which may in any way impair our 
military efficiency. In military success alone, we are 
firmly convinced, is to be found the true solution of 
our whole difficulty, the only force which can give 
vitality or permanence to any theory of settlement. 
As the matter now stands, it is idle to hope for either 
peace or safety until this question of military superi- 
ority is unmistakably and definitively settled. Upon 
this point then, the increase of our military efficiency, 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 29 

which embraces not merely the improvement of the 
condition of the army, but also, as we have endea- 
vored to show by English examples, and in a greater 
degree than is often supposed, the support of the 
Government in its general policy of conducting the 
war, should the efforts of all those who influence 
public opinion be concentrated. 

There is a certain class of men among us, not very 
numerous, perhaps, but still, owing to their position 
and culture, of considerable influence, who, accus- 
tomed to find in the European armies their standard 
of military efficiency, are disposed to doubt whether a 
force, composed as ours is of totally different materials, 
can accomplish great results. We may admit at once 
the superiority of foreign military organization, the 
result of the traditions of centuries of military experi- 
ence, digested into a thorough system, and carried out 
by long trained officers perfectly versed in the details 
of the service. Much inconvenience has necessarily 
resulted in our case from the ignorance of Regimental 
Officers, to a greater degree probably, however, from a 
want of proper care and attention on their part to the 
troops when in camp, than from any gross incompe- 
tency or misconduct on the field of battle. Instances 
of such misconduct there have undoubtedly been, but, 
considering the number of the officers and their want 
of experience, those instances are extremely rare, and 
when we call to mind the number of officers who have 
fallen, while leading their men in battle, out of pro- 



30 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

portion, as it undoubtedly is, with the losses in other 
war we may well palliate deficiencies in this respect, 
out of considerations for their heroic gallantry and de- 
votion. We do not underrate certainly the value of 
good officers, but history tells us that great victories 
have been achieved by armies who were no better led 
than ours. The incompetency of his officers was one of 
Wellington's standing complaints in Spain. Most of 
them knew absolutely nothing beyond the mere routine 
of garrison duty; they were all what is technically 
called " gentlemen," for each one had purchased his 
commission at a high price, but they had had no sys- 
tematic training in military schools, nearly all of them 
had had no actual experience of war, and their average 
intelligence was undoubtedly below that of the men 
who hold similar positions in our army.* All ac- 
counts agree that at that period, the scientific branches 

* We have no room to enumerate in detail the complaints made by 
the Duke of the officers of his army. Those who are interested in the 
subject may consult Col. Garwood's 4th volume, pages 343, 346, 352, 
363, 385, 399, and 407. The whole story is summed up, however, in 
the general order occasioned by the disorderly retreat from Burgos, in 
which the Duke said '' that discipline had deteriorated during the cam- 
paign in a greater degree than he had ever witnessed, or ever read of in 
any army, and this, without any disaster, or any unusual privation or 
hardship ; that the officers had from the first lost all command over 
their men, and that the true cause of this unhappy state of affairs was 
to be found in the habitual neglect of duty hy the Regimental Officers.''' 
This is the army of which the Duke said later, that "with it, he could go 
anywhere and do anything," and, good or bad, it saved Europe — in the 
English sense. 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 31 

of the great art of war were almost wholly neglected 
in the British army, and such was the happy igno- 
rance of the elements of strategy, that at a court 
martial composed of general officers for the trial of 
General Whitelock in 1808, for his failure at Buenos 
Ayres, it was necessary to explain to the court what 
was meant in military phrase by the " right bank " of 
a river. 

It is said again, by those who have the standard of 
foreign armies always before their eyes, that among 
our soldiers there is not a proper deference to rank, 
too much cmnaraderie in short, and that this is fatal 
to discipline. But it should be remembered that 
mere formal discipline may be one thing, and the true 
spirit of discipline another, and yet both may answer 
the same purpose. The first may be more showy 
than the latter, but not more valuable to real military 
efficiency. Everything depends upon the character 
of the soldier who is to be governed by it. The Brit- 
ish army is composed, as we all know, of the refuse 
of the population, and in the war in the Peninsula it 
was largely reinforced by the introduction into its 
ranks of convicts taken from the hulks, who were 
there expiating infamous offences. With such men, 
motives based on a sense of duty were powerless. 
Drunkenness, theft, marauding, a mutinous spirit un- 
der privations, and a fierce thirst of license which 
defied all control in the hour of victory, these were 
the brutal passions which could only be checked by 



32 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

the equally brute hand of force. But from such a 
vile herd, made useful only as a slave is made useful, 
by fear of the lash, to the civilized, sober, well edu- 
cated American citizen, animated with the conscious- 
ness that he is fighting for a great cause, in the success 
of which he and his children have a deep personal 
interest, and who learns obedience because both his 
common sense and his sense of duty recognize its 
necessity, how immeasurable is the distance ! The 
American volunteer, in this respect, has not had jus- 
tice done to his excellence. He is certainly a soldier 
essentially siii generis^ and when we hear sneers at 
his want of discipline, let us remember that although 
he may not regard his officers as superior beings, yet 
experience has already shown that in the cheerful per- 
formance of his new duties under privations ; in his 
freedom from those vices which in many minds are 
inseparably associated with the very idea of a soldier ; 
in his courage, endurance, and steadiness in battle ; 
and more than all, in those higher qualities which are 
the fruit of his education, general intelligence, and 
love of country, he presents himself to us as a figure 
hitherto wholly unknown in military history. 

One of the most cruel statements which party ran- 
cor has circulated in regard to the condition of the 
army is, that the rate of sickness and mortality is 
excessive, and that this is due to the neglect of the 
government. Fortunately we have the means of show- 
ing that these statements are false. From June 1, 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 33 

1861, to March 1, 1862 — nine months — the annual 
rate of mortaUty for the whole army is ascertained to 
be 53 in a thousand, and the sickness rate 104 in a 
thousand. The returns for the summer campaigns 
are not yet printed, but it will appear from them that 
in the army of the Potomac on the 10th of June, 
after the battle of Fair Oaks, and while the army was 
encam_ped on the Chickahominy, the whole number 
of sick, present and absent, compared with the whole 
force of that army present and absent, was 128 in a 
thousand. During the stay of the army on the Pe- 
ninsula it lost less than 14,000 men by death from dis- 
ease and wounds, and the average sickness rate during 
the campaign was about that which has for some time 
prevailed in the whole army, less than ten per cent, 
of the whole force. It appears, strange to say, that 
the army was more healthy when in the trenches 
before Yorktown, than at any other period of the 
campaign. Compare this with the English experi- 
ence. We have already said that Wellington lost 
about one-third of his whole army from malarious 
fever on his retreat from Talavera: on the 1st Octo- 
ber, 1811, the Anglo-Portuguese army had 56,000 
men fit for duty, and 23,000 sick in hospitals ; and in 
the Crimea, while the annual rate of mortality for the 
whole war was 232 in a thousand, the period of active 
operations, the last three months of 1854 and the first 
three months of 1855, shows the fearful rate of 711 
deaths in every thousand men. 



34 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

It cannot be doubted that to many the most unfa- 
vorable symptom of our present condition is the slow 
progress of our arms. This slowness is more apparent 
than real, for the history of modern warfare scarcely 
shows an instance in which so great real progress has 
been made in the same space of time, and it is mani- 
fest that whenever our northern soldiers have had 
a chance of fighting the enemy on anything like 
equal terms, they have fully maintained their superi- 
ority. It is none the less true, however, that public 
expectation in this matter has been much disappoint- 
ed, and it is curious to look at some of the explana- 
tions given for it. The Prince de Joinville, in his 
recent pamphlet, speaking of the battle of Fair Oaks 
and of the neglect to throw bridges over the Chicka- 
hominy at the proper time, by means of which the 
whole rebel army might have been taken in flank, 
and probably destroyed, ascribes the neglect on one 
page to what he calls la lenteur Americaine^ which he 
seems to think always leads our countrymen to let the 
chance slip of doing the right thing at the right time, 
and again on the next to '•\faute cf organisation^ faute 
de hierarchies faute de lien, qui en resulte entre Vdme 
du chef et Varmee, lien 'puissant qui permet a un Gene- 
ral de demander d ses soldats et d^en ohtenir aveugle- 
ment ces efforts extraordinaires qui gagnent les hat- 
tailles.^^ In other words, General M'Clelian, knowing 
that he could gain a decisive victory by laying down 
half a dozen bridges, which, it is stated, Avere all 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 35 

ready for the purpose, actually refused to order his 
soldiers to do it, because he was afraid they would 
not obey his orders. And this is the Prince's judg- 
ment of an army, which, a few weeks later, according 
to his own account, fought five battles in as many 
days, all, with one exception, victories over an enemy 
at least double its numbers, and arrived at its new 
base on the James River in excellent condition and 
without the slightest taint of demoralization. This 
illustration shows the absurdity of ascribing the want 
of immediate success to la lenteur Americaine, a qua- 
lity, by the way, which we learn for the first time is 
one of our national characteristics. 

Among the many causes which might be named, all 
perfectly legitimate, and presenting no obstacle which 
a little experience will not remove, we venture to 
suggest but one, and that is the character of the early 
military education of our higher officers. The system 
pursued at "West Point, although admirable for quali- 
fying officers for the scientific and staff corps of the 
army, seems to fail in teaching the young soldier, 
what is just now the most important quality he can 
possess for command, the character and capacity of 
volunteer soldiers. The system of discipline he has 
been taught is that which governs the regular army, 
a system modelled upon the English, which is, with 
the exception of that in use in Russia, the most 
brutal and demoralizing known in any army in Eu- 
rope. No wonder, therefore, that when our educated 



36 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

soldiers are suddenly placed in high positions, and 
with great responsibilities, and when they discover 
that the sort of discipline which they have been 
taught is wholly out of place in securing the efficiency 
of a volunteer army, they are led to doubt whether it 
can ever be made efficient at all. These prejudices, 
however, are wearing away before the test of actual 
experience. Generals are gradually learning that 
they may confide in their men, even for desperate 
undertakings ; they begin to see in their true light 
the many admirable qualities of the volunteer ; and 
he, in turn, begins to understand something of that 
military system which seemed at first so irksome and 
meaningless to him ; and the advance of the army in 
the essentials of discipline has been proportionably 
rapid. 

There is a good deal of talk about the impossibility 
of conquering or subjugating the South, which is 
based upon very vague notions of what conquest and 
subjugation signify. It is surprising to find how even 
intelligent men have been imposed upon by this fa- 
vorite boast of the rebels and their sympathizers. A 
pretended saying of Napoleon is quoted, that "it is 
impossible to prevent any people determined on 
achieving its independence, from accomplishing its 
purpose ;" and it is confidently asked whether any one 
ever heard of the subjugation of twelve millions of 
people determined to be free. We reply that history, 
ancient and modern, is full of instances of the only 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 3 i 

sort of conquest or subjugation which any sane man 
proposes shall be submitted to by the South. No one 
thinks it possible or necessary, for the purpose in view, 
to occupy the whole South with garrisons, but simply 
to destroy the only support upon which its arrogant 
pretensions are based, namely, its military power. 
This gone, what becomes of all the rest? and this 
remaining, where is there any hope of permanent 
peace and safety to us 1 For what is all war but an 
appeal to force to settle questions of national interest 
which peaceful discussion has failed to settle ; and 
what is an army, but only another argument, the 
ultima ratio, which, if successful in decisive battles, 
must give the law to the conquered \ To say nothing 
of instances in ancient history, Poland, Hungary, and 
Lombardy in our day were just as determined to be 
free as the South is, and quite as full of martial ardor ; 
and certainly Prussia, Spain under the Bonaparte 
dynasty, and the French Empire, are all examples of 
nations which valued their independence, and had 
tenfold the resources for maintaining it which the 
South possesses ; yet the capture of Warsaw, the sur- 
render of Villages, the battles of Novara, of Jena, of 
Salamanca, and of Waterloo respectively, settled as 
definitively the fate of the inhabitants of those coun- 
tries and their future condition as if the terms imposed 
by the conquering army had been freely and unani- 
mously agreed upon by the representatives of the 
people in Congress assembled. And, in like manner, 



38 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

can any one doubt, looking at the present comparative 
resources of the two sections, that if we should gain 
two decisive battles, one in the East and the other in 
the West, which should result in the total disorgani- 
zation of the two rebel armies, and thus enable us 
to interpose an impassable barrier between them, we 
should soon hear a voice imploring in unmistakable 
accents peace on our own terms "? It would not be a 
matter of choice, but of necessity ; a simple question 
of how far the progress of exhaustion had been car- 
ried, and that once settled, and no reasonable hope of 
success remaining, the war would not last a week 
longer. This is the experience of all nations, and our 
Southern rebels, notwithstanding their noisy boast- 
ing, do not differ in their capacity of resistance 
from the rest of mankind. " Hard pounding this, 
gentlemen," said the Duke of Wellington to his 
officers, as he threw himself within one of the un- 
broken squares of his heroic infantry at Waterloo, 
" but we'll see who can pound the longest •'^ and the 
ability of that infantry to "pound the longest" on 
that day settled the fate of Europe for generations. 

Let us bend, then, our united energies to secure, 
as much as in us lies, success in the field, and that 
success gained, we may be sure that all things will 
follow. Let us recognize with confidence as co-workers 
in this great object all, never mind what opinions 
they may entertain about the causes of the war, and 
the new issues which its progress has developed,, who 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. - 39 

desire in all sincerity, no matter from what motive, 
the success of our arms. Upon such a basis, the 
wider and more catholic our faith becomes the better, 
" In essentials Unity ; in non-essentials Liberty ; in 
all things Charity :" this should be our motto. The 
only possible hope for the South is in our own divi- 
sions. Let us remember that with success all things 
are possible ; without it, all our hopes and theories 
vanish into thin air. With success in the field, we 
should not only disarm the rebellion, and rid our- 
selves forever of the pestilent tribe of domestic traitors 
by burying them deep in that political oblivion which 
covers the Tories of the Revolution, and those who 
sneered at the gallant exploits of our navy in the war 
of 1812, but also force public opinion abroad, whose 
faithlessness to the great principles which underlie 
all modern civilization has been one of the saddest 
developments of this sad war, to exclaim at last, 
^''Invidiam gloria superdsfV^ 



LEJa'13 



II 



